ACCESS CONTROL PROGRAMMING LIBRARY AND EXPLORATION SYSTEM by Qiu, Zhitao
Michigan Technological University 
Digital Commons @ Michigan Tech 
Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's 
Reports - Open 
Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's 
Reports 
2015 
ACCESS CONTROL PROGRAMMING LIBRARY AND EXPLORATION 
SYSTEM 
Zhitao Qiu 
Michigan Technological University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
Copyright 2015 Zhitao Qiu 
Recommended Citation 
Qiu, Zhitao, "ACCESS CONTROL PROGRAMMING LIBRARY AND EXPLORATION SYSTEM", Master's report, 
Michigan Technological University, 2015. 
https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds/912 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
ACCESS CONTROL PROGRAMMING LIBRARY AND
EXPLORATION SYSTEM
By
Zhitao Qiu
A REPORT
Submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
In Computer Science
MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
2015
© 2015 Zhitao Qiu

This report has been approved in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the Degree
of MASTER OF SCIENCE in Computer Science.
Department of Computer Science
Report Advisor: Dr. Jean Mayo
Committee Member: Dr. Ching-Kuang Shene
Committee Member: Dr. Min Wang
Department Chair: Dr. Min Song

Dedication
To my mother, teachers and friends
who didn’t hesitate to criticize my work at every stage - without which I would neither
be who I am nor would this work be what it is today.

Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 DTEvisual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Multi-level Security (MLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 MLSvisual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Role-based Access Control(RBAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
vii
2.3.2 RBCvisual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Programming library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.2 Wrapper API Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.3 API Initialization and Termination Function . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.4 System Call Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.4.1 Common Steps of Making Access Control Request 22
3.2.4.2 Functions Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Access Control Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.1 Design Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.2 Access Control Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 TCP - Process Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4.1 TCP Server and Handler in the Python Engine . . . . . . . 32
3.4.2 TCP Client in the Programming Library . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 Visualization Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Test Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Test Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
viii
4.4 Correctness Test Through Interactive Command Mode . . . . . . . 41
4.5 Correctness Test Through Container Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.6 System Robustness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.6.1 Invalid Case Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.6.2 Stressful Condition Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.7 Visualization Interface Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A Speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.1 DTE SPECIFICATION SYNTAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.2 MLS SPECIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
ix

List of Figures
2.1 DTE General Graph and Type Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
(a) General Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
(b) Type Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 MLS General Graph and Object Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
(a) General Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
(b) Object Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 RBAC Hierarchy View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 Programming Library Exploration System Design . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Policy Engine Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1 Visualization Interface Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
xi

List of Tables
3.1 acv init Parameters Mapping Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Permission Mode Mapping Table For Accessing a Directory . . . . . 26
xiii

Abstract
The high complexity of advanced security models in the modern trusted systems
requires an eﬀective formal education for students. Education access control tools
have been promoted. Though they can beneﬁt the learning through analyzing or
visualizing access control policies, few of them are designed to teach development of
access control policies.
In this report, we propose an access control programming library which can provide
students hand-on experience with the eﬀect of an access control policy on a running
program. A student can write a policy and then run programs under the policy.
The Programming Library provides a system call wrapper API which enforces the
developed policy in the execution of a process. The program and policy exist at the
user level. No administrator access is required. From another hand, students can
monitor how the process is aﬀected by the policy through this tool and adjust the
rules accordingly. Furthermore, an Access Control Shell was designed as an interactive
command interface to execute the wrapper APIs, as well as a test platform or a
container to launch student program. Finally, we deﬁned an interface for further
communication with existing visualization tools, which depict the program execution
using visualizations speciﬁc to the policy model.
xv

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In a trusted system, the principle of least privilege is applied to make sure that
only essential information or resources are provided to complete a task. Fine-grained
enforcement of the policy rules and mandatory controls for the organization security
policy are required. Advanced access control technologies and sophisticated abstract
security models have evolved, such as Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) [1], Multi-
level Security (MLS) [6] and Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [7]. These models
enforce the above mentioned principle eﬀectively in modern security systems.
The real system usually contains mixture of those advanced models which signiﬁcantly
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increase the complexity of learning. Hence, formal education must be provided to
students to apply the sophisticated technologies correctly [2]. Yet, in order to achieve
eﬀective education in this area, students need hands-on experience to develop a deeper
understanding of multiple security models.
There are some implementations of these access control security models like Redhat
Linux. However, these are problematic for direct use in security education due to
the complexity of large policies with mixed security models and great administration
overhead. Instead, a simpliﬁed and customized pedagogical system is more suitable
for teaching principles and performing assignments through combining diﬀerent tech-
nologies and tools. This cuts the learning curve and encourages students to gain
experience.
1.2 Motivation
Pedagogical visualization tools (DTEvisual, MLSvisual, RBCvisual) have been de-
signed separately to depict the security models and allow students to develop or
analyze a policy [3,4]. These, which deploys speciﬁc graphs to analyze the security
policies , or allow students to develop a policy form scratch. These tools beneﬁt
students by building a solid understanding in the security models, and improve the
eﬀectiveness of security education.
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However, in order for students to understand the eﬀect of a policy on the dynamic
system of processes that comprise a real system, an access control programming
library that wraps the system call API to enforce the Mandatory Access Control
policies. This allows students to monitor and explore the credentials of processes
during their execution.
We developed a system call wrapper API that allows students to run a program
under a policy they develop. RBAC, MLS, and DTE are all supported. Policies are
implemented at the user level. No administrator privilege is required. The running
program can interact with existing model-speciﬁc visualization systems to further
help students understand policy development under modern models of access control.
3

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces the fundamental technologies of Mandatory Access Control
and related work.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC ) is usually enforced by an organization’s security
policy and is not at the discretion of any single user[2]. In MAC, even the root user is
constrained by the policy. In contrast, Discretionary Access Control (DAC) system
users or owners have control over the resources assigned. Just like in Unix ﬁle system,
DAC users can change ﬁle permissions for User, Group and Others [5].
The following sections will introduce three types of MAC security models in detail.
The visualization tool for each model has been developed to assist students in analyze
and developing related policies. Each tool contains diﬀerent graphs based on the
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characteristics of the speciﬁc models. These tools operate on the policies written in
model speciﬁc languages and implement parsers to translate the policy speciﬁcation
to access control matrix. The syntax for each model speciﬁcation is introduced in the
tool section.
2.1 Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE)
2.1.1 Introduction
DTE is an enhanced type enforcement access control technology, where system is
partitioned into diﬀerent access control domains and types [1]. In type enforcement
for UNIX, domains are deﬁned as collections of active subjects (processes) and types
are associated with passive objects (ﬁles, messages, other resources) [1].
Instead of using complex tables to stand for authorized access modes between domains
and types or domains and domains, DTE System enforces the access control policies
through a high level language called DTE Language (DTEL) [1]. Access to objects
in diﬀerent domains are decided through the speciﬁcations written in DTEL. In a
DTE UNIX system, access control rules in a DTEL speciﬁcation are processed and
enforced at the level of UNIX kernel [1]. Access rights are granted to domains which
group the processes. Therefore, even root processes in DTE UNIX are subjected to
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DTE policy.
DTE provides a process oriented access control[2] by placing statements on domains,
which constrain the exact object types that each process or subject can access. This
helps students to think about the principle of least privilege from the view of subject
precisely. Aforementioned beneﬁts of DTE and further applications in education are
introduced in Carr and Mayo’s paper [2], which forms one important foundation for
this project.
The syntax of DTEL is described in next subsection.
2.1.2 DTEvisual
DTEvisual is a visualization tool to facilitate the learning of DTE, which provides two
graphical visualizations for a selected DTE policy: the General Graph and the Type
Graph [3]. The General Graph depicts domains, types, transitions between domains,
and access from domains to a given type.The Type Graph shows object types and is
displayed using a radial tree. All the ﬁles at the same level in the directory hierarchy
are connected using a dotted circle. Directories are indicated by a trailing slash.
Diﬀerent types are identiﬁed through color of the labels [3]. Figure 2.2 shows the two
type of graphs.
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(a) General Graphs (b) Type Graph
Figure 2.1: DTE General Graph and Type Graph
Users can create a DTE speciﬁcation from scratch using the graph operations, or they
can import the speciﬁcation, and then analyze and modify the graph.
DTE speciﬁcation in DTEvisual is a text-based policy which follows speciﬁc syntax
of Domain Type Enforcement Language (SDTEL). The list 2.1 is a sample of SDTEL
speciﬁcation. Please see detailed speciﬁcation syntax introduction in Appendix A.
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Listing 2.1: DTE Sample Speciﬁcation
type dte_t ,readable_t ,generic_t ,writable_t ,sysbin_t ,log_t;
domain login_d = (/usr/bin/login),
(cdrw ->writable_t),
(exec ->student_d ,admin_d);
(dr ->generic_t ,dte_t),
domain admin_d = (/usr/bin/{sh,csh ,ksh}),
(cdrwx ->generic_t);
(drwx ->dte_t ,writable_t ,readable_t ,sysbin_t),
domain student_d = (/usr/bin/{sh ,csh ,ksh}),
(drx ->sysbin_t),
(cdrwx ->generic_t),
(dr ->readable_t),
(drw ->writable_t ,dte_t);
initial_domain = login_d;
assign -r log_t /usr/data/log;
assign -r generic_t /;
assign -r readable_t /etc/test/;
assign -r -s sysbin_t /usr/bin ,/bin ,/sbin;
assign -r writable_t /usr/data/record ,/temp;
assign -r -s dte_t /dte/policy;
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2.2 Multi-level Security (MLS)
2.2.1 Introduction
MLS is based on the Bell-LaPadula model, which is consistent with military-style
classiﬁcations [13]. MLS uses categories on objects and clearances for subjects. In the
conﬁdentiality classiﬁcation, security clearances reﬂect the order of security sensitive
levels; categories comes from the “need to know” principle[13] that subjects should
only be granted to read the objects required by the job. For example, the security
clearances range from top-secret to public, and categories range from weapon to
mobile-device. Security levels combine clearances and categories. For example, Jack
is cleared into the level (top-secret, weapon, mobile-device), and a tank document is
at the level of (secret, weapon). In this example, Jack can read the tank document.
The dominates relation can be suggested from this example, which is deﬁned as below:
Dominates: the security level (L,C) dominates the security level (L′, C ′)
if and only if L′ ≤ L and C ′ ⊆ C[13].
The set of security levels form a lattice corresponding to the domination relation from
the power set of that set[13]. The domination relation decides the access rights. In
the example above, level (top-secret, weapon, mobile-device) dominates level (secret,
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weapon). Jack can read access to the tank document. The access control process
induced from the domination relation can be simply characterized by the phrase “no
read up and no write down” [5]. This phrase reﬂects two important properties: simple
security property and star-property. The simple security property prevents a subject
read an object of a higher security level; meanwhile, the star-property requires a
subject not write to a lower security level object [5]. Hence, in this example, Star-
property further can prevent Jack write access to the tank document, which constrains
the information ﬂow from high to low.
2.2.2 MLSvisual
The visualization tool MLSvisual focuses on the interpretation of the security level
hierarchy as well as the read and write permissions to ﬁles for users with diﬀerent
clearance levels. Figure 2.2 shows two types of MLS graphs. The General Graph
allows users to explore the lattice formed by the set of security levels by building
portions of interest. For example, the user may select a node and add its predecessors
or successors, or select two nodes and build that portion of the lattice that connects
them. The Object Graph depicts the security levels assigned to objects, which forms
concentric circles surrounding the root directory. Each node consists of two colors,
left for clearance and the right for the category [4].
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(a) General Graphs (b) Object Graph
Figure 2.2: MLS General Graph and Object Graph
MLS Speciﬁcation syntax is similar to SDTEL, but has its own semantics. List 2.2 is
a sample of this. Detailed illumination can be found in Appendix A.
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Listing 2.2: MLS Sample Speciﬁcation
clearances:top <secret <topsecret <seven
#Category section: list all the categories , no order is required. Syntax: "←↩
categories: category1 , category2 , ..."
categories:Michigan ,Washington
#Assign security levels to directories in the file system. Syntax: "assign ←↩
clearance:category1:category2 :... [-r | -s] directory1 , directory2 , ..."
assign secret:Michigan -r /usr , /top
assign seven:Washington /usr/weaponCatalog
#Assign security levels to users. Syntax: "users clearance:category1:category2 :...←↩
user1 , user2 , ..."
users secret:Michigan:Washington Ning , Mike
users seven:Washington David , Jack
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2.3 Role-based Access Control(RBAC)
2.3.1 Introduction
Role-based Access Control models only assign access rights to roles[7]. Users are
assigned to roles, and then acquire permissions through inheritance from the roles.
This feature is similar to the UNIX group based access control; it can also serve as
implementation for DAC, as well as MAC. As a generalized approach, RBAC models
are now widely accepted[7].
2.3.2 RBCvisual
RBCvisual deﬁnes two graphical views: Matrix view and Hierarchy view. Matrix view
presents two tables about the role-to-object permission and user-to-role assignment.
Hierarchy view in Figure 2.3 depicts the relationships in a graph where nodes stand
for users and roles, and edges show the inheritance relationship between the nodes.
Another graph reﬂects the permission assignment corresponding to the highlighted
node.
RBAC Speciﬁcation syntax is more straightforward than that of the DTE and MLS
14
Figure 2.3: RBAC Hierarchy View
models. It contains three sections which deﬁne the hierarchy of the roles, the role-
to-user assignment and role-to-object assignment. Please ﬁnd a sample speciﬁcation
with a simple introduction in the List 2.3.
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Listing 2.3: RBAC Sample Speciﬁcation
#Section 1: define the inheritance relation between the roles
inheritance: Admin > Users
inheritance: Users > Guest
#Section 2: define the role -to -user assignment
user: Guest Gerry
user: Users Ping
user: Admin Lucy , Ping
#Section 3: define the role -to -object assignment
object: Guest ,Admin , Users r,w,x /TestFile1
object: Guest ,Admin , Users r,w /TestFile1
object: Users , Admin r,w /TestFile2
object: Admin r,w,x /TestFile2
16
Chapter 3
Implementation
3.1 Introduction
The access control programming library and related exploration system is based on
the access control policy languages adopted in the visualization tools, and the parsers
are extracted from the visualization tools mentioned in Chapter 2.
The system design contains two major components: a Programming Library (wrapper
API), a Policy Engine (policy translation and access control analysis).The system
also implements an interface to the visualization tools. The design of the exploration
system is depicted in Figure 3.1. The wrapper API are written in C. The Policy
Engine and other parts are written in Python.
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Programming 
Library ACV Agent
 Policy Engine
ACV Visualization
ACV Exploration SystemACV SHELL
Policy 
Specification
Student 
Program
Figure 3.1: Programming Library Exploration System Design
The Programming Library provides a wrapper API for the system call API. The
wrapper for a system call will make an appropriate access request before performing
the requested system call. Then the Engine Agent will forward the request to the
Policy Engine to make a decision. This request can trigger the visualization tool to
launch if visualization is conﬁgured and tools are in place. The model-speciﬁc graphs
can depict the policy rules in the visualization window.
TCP was used for the communications between modules including the connection
between the library and the policy engine, and the connection between the policy
engine and the visualization tools. The implementation of the process communication
for the connection between the library and the policy engine is one of the diﬃculties
in this project. Details regarding this will be addressed in the section of this chapter.
Finally, an Access Control Shell was created, which is an interactive command line
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interface for the application and test of the library wrapper API. It will be introduced
in Chapter 4.
3.2 Programming library
3.2.1 Introduction
The Programming library allows students to monitor the execution of a program
under a selected policy. The program usually operates on some system resources such
as creating a ﬁle or changing a ﬁle name. The access control wrapper API of the
Programming Library will be used to replace the system call API.
The next two sections will describe the design principles of the Programming Library
and introduce the implementation of the API functions.
3.2.2 Wrapper API Design Principles
The Programming library eﬀectively wraps the system calls through which access
requests are made. The names of routines in the wrapper API are comprised of the
string ”acv ” prepended to the corresponding system call. Additionally, some system
19
calls require parameters that are not part of the POSIX interface. For example, a call
to execvp may contain a parameter that designates the domain in which the process
will execute on successful completion of the routine.
Each model shares the same API interface, but extracts diﬀerent parameters to form
the access control request. For example, in the rename wrapper API, DTE extracts
Domain ID, whereas RBAC extracts Role Name and User Name.
3.2.3 API Initialization and Termination Function
Before using the wrapper API, function acv init has to be called to execute the re-
quired initialization. acv init handles the initial setting for the access control process,
such as the policy ﬁle name with the full path; launch the Engine Agent, which cre-
ates model speciﬁc policy manager and starts TCP server. acv init will make sure
only one Engine Agent exists in the system, so that only currently selected policy ﬁle
will be enforced. At the end of the student programs, acv end must be called to clean
up the resources including termination of the Engine Agent.
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int acv_init(const char *specPath ,const char * acv_param1 , const char *acv_param2 , ←↩
const char *vflag ,char *envp [])
# acv_init initializes the access control environment variables shared by the ←↩
wrapper API based on the input , creating a new process of the Engine Agent , ←↩
which imports the policy and listens to the access control request messages.
#Input arguments :
specPath: specification name ,
acv_param1 , acv_param2: model specific , refer to Table 3.1
vflag: need visualization or not
envp: defaulted to NULL; for environmental variables
#Usage example:
acv_init(path , RoleName , username , "-V", NULL);
int acv_env_init(int argc , char *argv [])
# acv_env_init is used with the test tool AC Shell , which already calls acv_init.←↩
Hence , acv_env_init will transfer the context of AC Shell to the student ←↩
program through the argc , argv variables passed by main entry function.
int acv_end ()
# acv_end cleans up resources such as closing sockets and terminating the Engine ←↩
Agent process.
#Return value for above three functions: 0 for success , -1 for failure (Upon ←↩
failure , program should exit).
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Table 3.1
acv init Parameters Mapping Table
Model acv param1 acv param2
RBAC RoleName Username
DTE InitialDomainID NONE
MLS UserName NONE
3.2.4 System Call Functions
This section will introduce the system call wrapper functions in the API. A selected
set of functions are implemented in the wrapper API. Each function will check the
model type and makes appropriate access control requests to get the authorization
before calling the POSIX system call. First, we will introduce the common steps
shared by the individual function, and then illustrate the details of each function.
3.2.4.1 Common Steps of Making Access Control Request
Generally, a system call wrapper function extracts access control parameters based
on the selected model, and then builds an access control request, which is further for-
warded to the Policy Engine for decision making. In other words, the implementation
for each security model will extract their own parameters and permission modes.
First, the wrapper API decides which kinds of objects to extract based on the targets
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of the system call function.
Second, the required access privileges of the objects are converted according to the
permission attributes of the operation. For example, in the RBAC model, the rename
function needs w + x access right for the parent folder of the target ﬁle.
Moreover, some model speciﬁc parameters like RoleName and UserName are obtained
from the access control global data. Those are initialized through acv init and can
be changed in the program through the Set functions of the Programming Library:
int set_username(const char *ac_typevalue);
int set_domainname(const char *ac_typevalue);
int set_rolename(const char *ac_typevalue);
At the end, the wrapper API receives the access control result from the Policy Engine.
It returns a failure code of rejection or performs the system call function if allowed.
Please note that the ultimate execution of a system call function is still subjected to
the underlying system access control, such as the DAC of UNIX. For example, even
when a MLS policy permits the execution of acv write to a ﬁle, if the owner of the
ﬁle sets the permission mode to read only like mode 0444 in Linux, the write system
call will fail.
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3.2.4.2 Functions Introduction
The following functions in the wrapper API are based on related POSIX Libc function
deﬁnition [8]. For detailed arguments format and usage of the functions, please refer
to the GNU POSIX Manual[8]. We will mainly introduce functions of the API from
the view of access control .
int acv_rename(const char *oldpath , const char *newpath ) ;
# acv_rename Rename a file by wrapping LIBC function rename. acv_rename function ←↩
is used to change the name of a file.
# acv_rename decides whether the parent folder or the file itself will be the ←↩
object for access control depending on the two cases below:
# 1) If target is a file , we are going to rename it , so the object is the file ←↩
itself;
# 2) If target is a directory , we move the file to target folder , so the object ←↩
is the parental directory of the file.
int acv_execvp(const char *file , char *const argv[],const char * acv_param );
# acv_execvp executes a file by wrapping LIBC function rename. Child process ←↩
executing the program specified by file will be forked [13]. Execution ←↩
permission will be requested and appropriate mode value will be fetched based ←↩
on the model. acv_param is NULL , except for DTE , it is the Domain ID for the ←↩
command to execute.
int acv_creat(const char *pathname , mode_t mode);
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# acv_creat creates a file by wrapping LIBC function creat.The argument mode ←↩
follows the same definition of creat. acv_creat is equivalent to acv_open with ←↩
flags equal to O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC [14]. Permission rights ←↩
corresponding the required value in the flags are checked. Write permission is ←↩
checked for the parental folder of the pathname (Table 2).
int acv_write(int fildes , const void *buf , size_t nbytes);
# Write a file by wrapping LIBC function write. fildes is returned from acv_creat←↩
. Access right is checked through acv_creat.
int acv_read(int fildes , void *buf , size_t nbytes);
# read a file by wrapping LIBC function read. fildes is returned from acv_creat. ←↩
Access right is checked through acv_creat.
int acv_open(const char *pathname , int oflags);
# Open a file by wrapping LIBC function open.The argument mode follows the same ←↩
definition of open. Permission rights corresponding the required value in the ←↩
flags are checked.
int acv_access(const char * filename , int mode);
# Delete directories by wrapping LIBC function rmdir. The argument mode follows ←↩
the same definition of access. Permission rights for the file corresponding the←↩
required value in the modes are checked.
int acv_mkdir(const char * pathname , int mode);
# Create directories by wrapping LIBC function mkdir. The argument mode follows ←↩
the same definition of mkdir. Write permission is checked for the parental ←↩
folder of the pathname (Table 3.2).
int acv_rmdir(const char * pathname);
# Delete directories by wrapping LIBC function rmdir. Write permission is checked←↩
for the parental folder of the pathname (Table 3.2).
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int acv_chdir(const char *pathname);
# Change to the target directories by wrapping LIBC function chdir. Search ←↩
permission is checked for the parental folder of the path (Table 3.2 For MLS , ←↩
it corresponds to the read right.
int acv_remove(const char *pathname);
# Delete a file by wrapping LIBC function remove. Remove permission is checked ←↩
for the parental folder of the path (Table 3.2).
Return value for above functions :0 for success , -1 for failure
Table 3.2
Permission Mode Mapping Table For Accessing a Directory
Model search read remove/write
RBAC x rx wx
DTE d rxd wxd
MLS r r w
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3.3 Access Control Engine
3.3.1 Design Structure
Figure 3.2 depicts the design of the policy engine.
Figure 3.2: Policy Engine Structure
The Policy Engine consists of 3 components, each of which is implemented in one
python class: an Engine Agent, a TCP Server, and a Policy Manager (parser and de-
cision function). The Engine Agent containing the main method is the entrance of the
Policy Engine. The Policy Engine runs as a single process which is launched through
the system call of python acv agent.py in acv init with appropriate parameters such
as a model policy and a visualization ﬂag. This section will introduce Engine Agent
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and Policy Manager. TCP Server will be introduced in next section .
During the execution of python acv agent.py, an instance of Engine Agent is created.
The Engine Agent will further create a Policy Manager instance, which further im-
ports the policy. Then, a TCP Server instance will be created and starts to listen for
access control requests. After processing by the TCP Server, the itemized message
will be passed to the Policy Manager for access control decision. Meanwhile, the En-
gine Agent will also bring up a visualization tool if conﬁgured. A copy of the request
will be transferred to the tool.
The Policy Manager is the core of the Policy Engine. It is responsible for parsing the
policy and decision making for the access control requests. Abstract Factory Design
Pattern which uses generic interface of the factory to create concrete objects[5] was
adopted in the implementation of Policy Manager. The abstract class deﬁnes two
interfaces import policy and acv query. A concrete policy manager for a speciﬁc
model is chosen in the run time when running the program. This greatly increases
the ﬂexibility of Programming Library. Students can write the same program and
execute it under diﬀerent security models. The Programming Library can decide at
run time which exact policy parser and decision logic to use based on the necessary
input, such as the model type or policy path.
For example, given a model type of RBAC, an instance of classs RBACPolicyMgr
which implements the Policy Manager for RBAC is created through the factory. Then,
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RBACPolicyMgr further calls importPolicy function, where the RBAC parser will
translate the policy and extract access control matrices from the speciﬁcation state-
ments written in the corresponding RBAC language mentioned in Chapter 2. Upon
receiving an access control request, the decision routing will be called and appropriate
response will be returned to the originating API function through TCP message.Upon
receiving a request, acv query of the Engine Agent will pass the itemized message to
the queryManager function of RBACPolicyMgr, which further calls RBAC decision
function queryUserAccessObjFromRole to grant the access.The decision function will
be described in next subsection.
Below two lists show the code snapshot for the Policy Manager Factory and the
Engine Agent.
Listing 3.1: ACV Engine PolicyMgr Factory
class ACVEnginePolicyMgrFactory(object):
@staticmethod
def create_policy_manager(policy_type):
if policy_type == "RBAC":
return RBACPolicyMgr ()
elif policy_type == "DTE":
return DTEPolicyMgr ()
elif policy_type == "MLS":
return MLSPolicyMgr ()
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Listing 3.2: Engine Agent
class ACV_Agent ():
def __init__(self , PolicyPath): #read from command arguments
self.acv_policy_manager = ACVEnginePolicyMgrFactory.←↩
create_policy_manager(getModelType(PolicyPath))
self.acv_policy_manager.importPolicy(PolicyPath)
def acv_query(self , itemized_acv_message):
answer ,output = self.acv_policy_manager.queryManager(itemized_acv_message)
3.3.2 Access Control Decision
The decision routing in each model speciﬁc policy manager handles the itemized
access control requests. Access control request is itemized for each model as following:
for DTE, domain ID, access object and requested permission set (RqsPermSet); for
RBAC, role name, access object and RqsPermSet; for MLS, subject, object and
RqsPermSet.
Each model has its own decision routing to authorize the request. But they share
the same logic. Let’s deﬁne PolicyPermSet as the permission set deﬁned in the
policy. First, the DTE handling routing will pull out the PolicyPermSet from the
policy data matrices for above described items presented in the request. For ex-
ample, to handle an access control request of DTE, routing queryDomainAccessObj
of DTEPolicyManager will extract the PolicyPermSet for the domain student d and
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access object /home/zhitaoq/Document/test.log. Then, RqsPermSet will be com-
pared with PolicyPermSet to see it is satisﬁed or not for the authorization through:
RqsPermSet.issubset(PolicyPermSet).
3.4 TCP - Process Communication
There are several methods to communicate between the diﬀerent processes or compo-
nents, but for this project, TCP socket was chosen.The reasons other methods were
not selected are based on two factors: language and ﬂexibility.
First, the Library code was written in C language which is diﬀerent from the lan-
guage used for the Policy Engine, which is Python. After some trials, the other
methods such as message queue and pipe were found not appropriate for the cross-
language communication in this project. Message queue was used initially, which
was implemented in a third party module sysv ipc adopted by the Python library to
communicate with C language function directly, but sysv ipc is not well tested and
still has bugs. Sometimes the messages sent from a C process to a Python process
were malformed. In contrast, the TCP Sockets are well-implemented and tested for
this purpose as a relatively high level communication method between processes.
31
Second, while integrating the aforementioned diﬀerent components into a whole explo-
ration system, it is important that the system can be low coupling and high cohesion.
TCP Socket communication can minimize the coupling between components [10].
Compared to TCP Sockets, the pipe mechanism reduces the ﬂexibility. TCP Socket
interface is especially useful in this project because the Programming Library must
run in two modes with or without the visualization component. This is an example
of what Robert Frost mentioned “Good fences make good neighbors.” This chapter
mainly focuses on introducing the implementation between the Programming Library
and the Policy Engine.
In the socket communication, we use the Client and Server model. Engine Agent acts
as a TCP Server to accept messages from the Programming library, which plays the
role of a TCP Client.
3.4.1 TCP Server and Handler in the Python Engine
This subsection describes the main process to establish the TCP server through the
Python Library’s socket module.
First, the module tcpserver was designed. This exposes the object acv server and
the method agent tcphandler. acv server is a wrapper function for Python socket
module, which initializes the host name, port and debugging setting. It contains a
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start method for the caller to create the socket, and then bind and listen. Incoming
connection requests were bound with the agent tcphandler, which accepts the argu-
ments of the acv agent, tcp connection and sock address. In method agent tcphandle,
acv query method of acv agent passes the access request message to the Policy Man-
ager. Afterward, the server responds to the client through the sendall method of the
TCP connection.
If visualization is enabled, these request messages from the Programming Library will
be passed to the visualization tool to display graphs for the students to monitor the
execution process.
3.4.2 TCP Client in the Programming Library
In the Programming Library, the Access Control Channel function is responsible for
delivering a Access Control Request message to the decision engine. Coding the TCP
Client in C language to communicate with Python TCP Server is problematic and
introduced a lot diﬃculty in two way communications, as well as in the debugging.
Later we changed the problem and ﬁxed it by introducing the embed Python Inter-
preter in C language. TCP Client is then also coded in Python language. Detailed
implementation as below.
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1. Build a separate Python module acv query.py to implement the actual socket
client, which connects to the server and receives response.
2. extend and embed the Python Interpreter in the Access Control Channel func-
tion.
(a) Initialize the Python Interpreter through Py Initialize(), which creates fun-
damental python modules and maintains a related table for the resources,
as well as calculating the module search path from the environment vari-
ables.
(b) Import module acv query, and save the result to a callable PyObject:
pQueryFunc which is a pointer to represent the actual Python object.
(c) Call Python/C API PyObject CallObject to pass the ACV Request mes-
sage to pQueryFunc [11].
Listing 3.3: Embed Python Interpreter
pQueryModule = PyImport_Import(PyString_FromString ((char*)"acv_query.py"));
pDict = PyModule_GetDict(pQueryModule);
pQueryFunc = PyDict_GetItemString(pDict , (char*)"acv_query");
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There are two notes about the usage of this Python/C library API.
1. Include header ﬁle Python.h before any other standard header ﬁles, because
it contains some pre-processor deﬁnitions which might bring some impact to
others [9].
2. Set PYTHONPATH TO working directory setenv(”PYTHONPATH”,”.”,1);
3.5 Visualization Interface
To launch the visualization tools in run time and allow more graphic monitoring
features to be created in the future, we have deﬁned the interface in the Programming
Library and other related components.
First, the visualization can be conﬁgured through acv init argument. The AC Shell
also preserves the -V ﬂag, which will pass the visualization request through acv init
all the way to the Engine Agent.
Second, the Engine Agent will locate the visualization tool path through the system
path setting and launch the tool based on the model type for an access control request
sent from the Programming Library. After that, the refresh message will be sent for
each further access control request, which will be also buﬀered to allow replaying
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function in the tools.
The process communication between the Visualization tools and Policy Engine uses
TCP socket. The message handler acvisual tcp server and acvisua tcp handler are
similar to the versions of TCP server and handler described in the previous section.
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Chapter 4
Test
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, ﬁrst, we will introduce our test tool AC Shell, and then illustrate
the correctness and robustness test of the Programming Library and the access con-
trol decision. At last, visualization interface test is performed to make sure correct
message is passed to the visualization tool through TCP sockets.
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4.2 Test Tool
Access Control Shell (AC Shell) was designed as a test platform for the Program-
ming Library as well as a command line tool to practice the policy speciﬁed system
programming. Basically, AC Shell is a command-line interpreter based on the open
source Google Mini Shell [12], which reads user’s input as a command and executes
it. In this report, we reshaped the mini shell to an interactive wrapper API test tool
by mapping a wrapper API to a shell built-in command. It also plays the role of
program execution container, through which students write their program without
much concern of the Programming Library initialization.
AC Shell collects necessary information for the Programming Library by establishing
an environment with default parameter values or acquiring the speciﬁed values based
on the user command line input. It will save these parameters as access control
context. When the student program is launched through the container, it will start the
Engine Agent and pass the AC Context to the student program. Hence, the students
can focus on the system programming. When AC Shell exits, it will terminate the
Engine Agent.
As an interactive command interface, it can test the wrapper APIs ﬂexibly and conve-
niently. Combination test of wrapper APIs can be performed by observing the result
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under diﬀerent policy setting. Model speciﬁc parameters like Domain Name, Role
Name or User Name can be changed as needed through running the Set command.
The changed values will be reﬂected in the access control request immediately without
the need to re-compile the program.
From another point of view, the Access Control Shell provides more hands-on ex-
perience in the system programming level for the students to explore the selected
policy.
Listing 4.1: AC Shell Command Line options
AC Shell command line instruction:
-E for execution of program , for example , Prog1.exe
-M for model type , MLS ,DTE , RBAC
-D for initial domain ID , student_d is provided as default value
-U for initial user name , Login name will be used as defaulted userName
-R for initial role name , stduent is the default value
-P for policy path Default is "policy" with the model type ,
such as, policy.rbac
One of model type or policy path must be speciﬁed. If model type is speciﬁed without
specifying policy, default policy will be used, for example, ”policy.mls”, ”policy.dte”
or ”policy.rbc”.
For example, ./acshell -E Prog1.exe -M MLS
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./acshell -E Prog1.exe -P policy/policy.mls
Test programs need to include below three parts to launch through AC Shell:
A) #include ”acv wrapper api.h”
B) acv env init(argc,argv)
Notes: pass AC Context or environment to student program
C) acv end();
Note: To execute programs without AC Shell, acv init() must be called to setup all
the parameters, for example,
RBAC : acv init(specPath, initRoleName, “zhitaoq”, “−NV ”, NULL);
4.3 Test Strategy
Generally the test consists two parts: correctness test of access control decision and
the system robustness test.
The correctness test of the access control logic for each of the three security models as
described in Section was performed separately under diﬀerent set of policies. The test
policies cover diﬀerent access control scenarios to verify the correct decision making.
The execution of the wrapper API was veriﬁed through observing the result code
and output message, which was compared against the expected code and output.
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Failure code (-1) and related outputs were deﬁned into indicate the corresponding
reject reasons. Test results were also observed to make sure that the underlying
discretionary access control of the system itself is not violated.
For the quality assurance of the software, the system robustness test veriﬁes that the
Programming Library and exploration system function correctly in the presence of
invalid inputs or stressful circumstances[3].
Based on diﬀerent approaches of using AC Shell, correctness tests were divided to
two parts: test through the interactive command line interface of AC Shell, and test
through container by executing student level test programs.
The Programming Library API unit tests are mainly performed in the ﬁrst part of
Correctness Test. Integration tests are mainly performed in the second part.
The system robustness test will be described in a separate section.
4.4 Correctness Test Through Interactive Com-
mand Mode
Before the API test, the selected policy needs to be imported to the ACV Shell in
the command line or through acv init, which is described in 3.2.
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Below is a sample test process which tests wrapper API acv rename for RBAC model.
The base policy is policy.rbac, as shown in Listing 4.1.
After running ./acv shell, acv init was executed with the arguments below, where
user zhitaoq has a role of graduate. NV stands for No Visualization.
[ACV Shell ] acv init PolicyPath graduate,zhitaoq,NV
First the API was tested with no permission conﬁgured.
The user zhitaoq inherits the permissions from the role graduate. How-
ever, graduate only has access to /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/Archive
with permission mode r,w,x. Renaming ﬁle parse.py under /Users/zhitao-
q/Wrap/trunk/src is not permitted by this policy. The arguments from the
command line were passed to the wrapper API to execute. The ACV Request
is denied by the policy engine. The ﬁnal result is printed as text log in the shell.
[ACV Shell]./acv rename /Wrap/trunk/src/parse.py /Wrap/trunk/src/parse.sh
Second added permission to src in the policy.rbac as below, and rerun the command
in ACV Shell. The ﬁle was renamed successfully.
object: graduate r,w,x -r /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/.
Beneﬁt from the interactive mode, this part of test can adjust the model speciﬁc
parameters to improve test productivity. Such as calling set RoleName Admin,
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set username to cathy, who is conﬁgured diﬀerent access rights to the object, can
perform a testcase without changing rule for Role graduate.
Based on the test cases designed, two or more APIs can also be combined to test in
ACV Shell interactively, such as after the command acv rename is executed success-
fully, acv execvp can be tested further. This can make sure complex scenario can be
covered in the test.
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Listing 4.2: Sample Base Test Policy
filename: policy.rbac
inheritance: dev > qc
inheritance: sales > qc , cust
inheritance: pres > sales , dev
inheritance: graduate > sales , dev
user: qc quinn
user: dev dave , dot ,zhitaoq
user: admin charles , dave , cathy
user: pres patty
user: sales sam
user: graduate zhitaoq
object: cust r,w,x /path/to/db
object: qc x /path/to/tests
object: dev r,w /path/to/tests
object: pres r,w /path/to/evidence
object: sales r,w -r /path/to/files
object: sales r,w,x /path/to/db
object: graduate r,w,x -r /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/Archive
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Listing 4.3: Test log for the denied case
HomePath is : /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src
SpecPath is : /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/policy/policy.rbac
setACVArgs start.
setACVArgs input :/ Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/policy/policy.rbac graduate zhitaoq←↩
-NV!
setACVArgs done!
To launch ACV Agent.SPECPATH IS : /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/policy/policy.rbac
Go to Loop for receiving message.
DEBUG:TCP Server:listening
Acv rename request.
DEBUG:server:Got connection
$acv_query$:zhitaoq ,graduate ,/ Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src ,wx
Python Engine Agent receive msg.
zhitaoq
graduate
/Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src
set(['x', 'w'])
requested permset:
set(['x', 'w'])
QueryManager: the role graduate has no permission.
deny:Role graduate has user zhitaoq assigned to it but has no access to the object ←↩
/Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src.
Result of call: -1
Renaming is not allowed.
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4.5 Correctness Test Through Container Mode
Test programs simulating student programs are written to test certain complex sce-
narios via the combinations of a subset of wrapper APIs.
A sample program is introduced here to describe the test process. Basically, it cre-
ates a ﬁle and writes some strings to the ﬁle. Next, the ﬁle is created under folder
/Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/. At last, it opens the ﬁle to read and prints out
the result.
Through this test mode, the program can be used to test policy of diﬀerent security
models. For example, this program tests a set of wrapper APIs for ﬁle operation.
First, we run the program with RBAC default speciﬁcation policy.rbac: ./acshell -E
Prog1 -m RBAC
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Listing 4.4: Partial RBAC policy
inheritance: student > sales , dev
User: student zhitaoq
object: student r,w,x /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/
With all the required permissions conﬁgured in the policy, this process is executed
successfully with the expected result. After executing the program and deleting the
read permission for the role graduate as below , the request of acv open with permis-
sion mode O RDONLY was denied.
object : graduatew, x− r/Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/
Listing 4.5: Sample Execution Log for RBAC
INFO:RbcPolicyManager:zhitaoq
INFO:RbcPolicyManager:graduate
INFO:RbcPolicyManager :/ Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/
INFO:RbcPolicyManager:requested permset:
INFO:RbcPolicyManager:set(['x', 'w'])
INFO:RbcPolicyManager:configured permset:
INFO:RbcPolicyManager:set(['r'])
Deny:Role graduate
acv_create is not allowed for : ACV_TEST_PROG1.log !
And then, we switched to test the DTE with default speciﬁcation policy.dte: ./acshell
-E Prog1 -M DTE -D student d
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Listing 4.6: Partial DTE policy
domain student_d = (/usr/bin/{sh ,csh ,ksh}),
(drx ->sysbin_t ,gradExec_t),
(cdrwx ->generic_t),
(dr ->readable_t ,gradReadable_t ,dte_t),
(drw ->studWritable_t),
(exec ->guest_d);
assign -r studWritable_t /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src;
Listing 4.7: Sample Execution Log for DTE
INFO:DTEPolicyManager:student_d
INFO:DTEPolicyManager :/ Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src
INFO:DTEPolicyManager:Requested: set(['d', 'w'])
INFO:DTEPolicyManager:Configured: set(['r', 'd', 'w'])
pass:good
performed acv_create.
At last, we execute Prog1 under MLS policy as below with default speciﬁcation pol-
icy.mls. User name is zhitaoq, with security level of secret:michigan, which has write
permission to higher level object top-secret:michigan.
./acshell -E Prog1 -M MLS
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Listing 4.8: Partial MLS policy
users secret:michigan zhitao
assign top -secret:michigan /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src
Listing 4.9: Sample Execution Log for MLS
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:Subject: zhitaoq
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:Subject: secret
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:Subject: set(['michigan '])
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:Object: /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:Object: top -secret
INFO:MLSPolicyManager:Object: set(['michigan '])
pass:good
performed acv_create ..
The decision result can be totally diﬀerent based on the rules deﬁned in the corre-
sponding policy.
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4.6 System Robustness Test
4.6.1 Invalid Case Handling
User enters the initial setting for the Programming Library through acv init or
acv env init for AC Shell. So our test must make sure correct arguments are passed.
First, speciﬁcation ﬁle input test. This test make sure correct policy path is speciﬁed
before further handling. We veriﬁed that incorrect policy path will be detected, and
program will terminate gracefully.
Second, that correct model type is selected. The model type must be one of the values
”DTE”, ”RBAC” or ”MLS”, which is extracted from the policy name or through AC
Shell command line input. Otherwise, the call of acv init or acshell will indicate the
failure.
Third, for other parameters, such as RoleName, UserName for RBAC, DomainID for
DTE, UserName for MLS if no values are speciﬁed, default values involved in the
access control process are veriﬁed.
Furthermore, tests are performed to cover the case that students write their programs
without calling acv init or acv env init. For example, one program calls acv rename
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directly. This test veriﬁes that the API call fails with appropriate message which
indicates AC Library not initialized.
4.6.2 Stressful Condition Test
The purpose for this test is to make sure the system still functions correctly and the
right policy will be enforced under the circumstances that multiple processes could
be launched at the same time.
First, tests are performed to make sure that only one policy can be selected in the
system at the same time. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the library initialization function
acv init or acv env init (launched by acshell) must be called at the beginning of
each program. The design of the function makes sure that only one policy agent
is allowed to exist in the system, which enforces one policy. So, when one process
already executes the policy agent, other programs can detect this and then terminate
accordingly.
Multiple-process tests are performed in two cases: with the same type of policy, and
with diﬀerent types of policy. The same test steps of below list are followed.
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Listing 4.10: Test Steps for Stress Test
1.Run selected programs simultaneously through shell script;
2. Verify that only one Engine Agent process starts , access control requests are←↩
handled correctly under the appropriate policy;
3. Verify that the processes spawned by the executing program terminate ←↩
gracefully , including the Engine Agent process , the TCP Server process;
4. Verify that sockets and files are closed;
4.7 Visualization Interface Test
This section introduces the test performed for the Visualization Interface.
To enable visualization mode, the value of −V must be entered in the ACV Shell
command line or set int the acv init function call of the Test Program. Then we ver-
ify that acv agent function detects the visualization request and launch the correct
visualization tool related to the speciﬁed model. If the visualization tool aforemen-
tioned in Chapter 2 is not installed in the system yet, a message will print out for
this. Otherwise, verify that the correct policy is selected and appropriate graphs are
displayed.
Following the above example of testing acv rename for RBAC in previous section.
Verify that when the permission request is rejected, the following graph is displayed
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to explain the rejected request. The related rules and graph nodes are highlighted. It
shows clearly that user zhitaoq which is role of graduate with limited privilege conﬁg-
ured to access /Users/zhitaoq/Wrap/trunk/src/Archive folder. Detailed permission
sets are printed in the top of right window. Figure 4.1 depicts this result visually.
Figure 4.1: Visualization Interface Test
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this report, we investigated three security models of Mandatory Access Control
technologies and visualization tools. We also implemented the Access Control Policy
Programming Library and the Exploration Shell. A selected collection of System Call
Wrapper APIs were implemented for the POSIX System Call APIs. Policy parsers
were extracted from the existing tools and integrated to the Policy Engine, and the
Access Control Policy Manager was also implemented to provide decision for the
Access Control Request.
This Programming Library and exploration system shows the students related pol-
icy credential changes in the execution of a running program in system level. The
information level for more or less logs can be adjusted conveniently. It also deﬁned
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the TCP socket interface to communicate with visualization tools, through which the
abstract access control process can be depicted visually. This achieved the expected
eﬀect as a pedagogical tool to provide the availability of hands-on experience in the
security formal education.
However, currently, the Programming Library just implemented a limited set of sys-
tem call wrapper APIs, which focus on the ﬁle system operations and binary execu-
tion. In the future, the library can be extended to cover more system call functions,
such as memory or process control, so that students can have more advanced security
programming experience.
In addition, this report describes a command line tool called Access Control Shell, but
it is mainly used as a wrapper API test platform and binary execution container. It
can be enhanced to contain more security functions or features similar to SE-Linux to
provide more hands-on experience for the students, such as adding a sesearch feature
of SE-Linux, or even build an access control Linux container (LXC) [11].
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Appendix A
Speciﬁcation
A.1 DTE SPECIFICATION SYNTAX
DTE specification normally contains four sections [2 ,3].
Section 1 Type definition
Declares one or more object type names , which are then available to other parts of ←↩
a DTE specification. The statement starts with keyword Type and then lists all ←↩
the defined object types with suffix\_t. No ordering is required.
Syntax format: T y p e objecttype1_t , objecttype2_t , objecttype3_t ,
For example:
Type dte_t ,readable_t ,generic_t ,writable_t ,sysbin_t ,projectA_t
Section 2 Domain definition
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Domain definition is expressed as a list of tuples. Domain definition statement ←↩
start with keyword domain and follows with domain ID and execution environment ←↩
.
Defines a restricted execution environment composed of three parts [1]:
a. Entry Program , executed by a process in order to enter the domain , for ←↩
example , /usr/bin/login for domain login_d ,
b. Define Access permissions to the object types , e.g. drwx ->writable_t . This←↩
contains multiple lines.
c. Permissions to access programs in other domains e.g. exec ->user_d for ←↩
domain login_d. Or allow Auoto transition to another domain , like (auto ->←↩
login_d) for daemon_d.
domain daemon_d = ( /sbin/init),
(dr ->generic_t ,readable_t ,dte_t),
(cdrw ->writable_t),
(drx ->sysbin_t),
(auto ->login_d);
domain login_d = (/usr/bin/login),
(dr ->readable_t ,generic_t ,dte_t),
(cdrw ->writable_t),
(exec ->admin_d , user_d , graduate_d ,faculty_d);
domain user_d = (/usr/bin/{sh,csh ,ksh}),
(drx ->sysbin_t),
(cdrwx ->generic_t),
(drw ->writable_t);
(dr ->readable_t ,dte_t),
Section 3 Initial domain
This section contains one statement to declare the initial DTE domain.
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initial_domain = daemon_d;
Section 4 Type Assignments
The assignments in this section will associate a type with one or more files.
Syntax format: a s s i g n [-r] typeId_t directory1 directory2 ;
A statement may be recursive , in which case it applies to all files in the ←↩
directory tree rooted at the named directory. Recursive assignment of a file ←↩
with prefix P overrides an assignment for a file with a prefix shorter than P. ←↩
For instance a recursive assign statement for /etc overrides a recursive ←↩
assignment for /.
Below are more examples:
assign -r generic_t /;
assign -r projectA_t /proj1;
assign -r projectB_t /proj2;
assign -r -s dte_t /dte;
assign -r writable_t /dev ,/usr/var/test ,/tmp/test ;
assign -r readable_t /etc;
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A.2 MLS SPECIFICATION
MLS specification normally contains four sections.
1) Section1: Clearance Statement
Define one or more clearance levels , which are then available to other parts of a ←↩
MLS specification. Clearance Statement starts with keyword clearances and then ←↩
lists all the defined security levels from low to high.
Syntax format: c l e a r a n c e s : level1 <level2 <
For example , there are three security levels from low to high as: unclassified , ←↩
secret , topsecret. We define the Clearance Statement as below:
clearances: unclassified <secret <topsecret
2) Section2: Category Statement
Define one or more categories , which are then available to other parts of a MLS ←↩
specification. Category Statement starts with keyword categories and then lists←↩
all the categories after it without ordering.
Syntax format: "categories: category1 , category2 ...
categories:weapon , nuclear , grocery
3) Section3: Directory Security Assignment Statement
Assign security levels to directories in the file system. The statement starts with←↩
assign , and then follows with the clearance level and categories , which are ←↩
assigned to the directory occurring at the end of the statement. One directory ←↩
can be assigned to multiple categories.
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Syntax format: "assign clearance: category1: category2 ... [-r | -s] directory1 , ←↩
directory2 ,
Here are some examples:
assign unclassified: -r /
assign secret:weapon -r /weapon
assign topsecret:nuclear -r /nuclear
4) Section4: User Security Assignment Statement
Assign security levels to users. This statement starts with keyword users and ←↩
follows with the clearance level and categories , which are assigned to the user←↩
list occurring at the end of the statement.
Syntax format: "users clearance: category1:category2 ... user1 , user2 ...
For examples:
users topsecret:nuclear:weapon ping
users topsecret:nuclear david
users unclassified: micky , lucy
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